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This paper introduces the work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre in the area 
of virtue and organisation.  It aims to provide one point of entry to MacIntyre’s work 
for readers who have not been introduced to it and makes some novel suggestions 
about its development for those who have.  Following some initial comments on 
MacIntyre’s approach to social science it traces the development of his ideas on 
organisation from 1953 to 1980 before outlining the general theory of virtues, goods, 
practices and institutions which emerged in the publication of his seminal After Virtue 
in 1981.  Finally the paper outlines some of the uses to which these ideas have been 




Alasdair MacIntyre is known as a moral philosopher rather than as an organisation 
theorist and he has indeed been self-critical in respect of his lack of attention to, what 
he has termed, the “productive crafts” (MacIntyre 1994a: 284).  However the growth 
of his influence across social science since the publication of his seminal After Virtue 
in 1981 (Soloman 2003: 142) has extended to work within organisation science 
though much of this work continues to be contested. 
 
It is in this context that we have written this paper. Its purposes are threefold.  First to 
introduce MacIntyre’s ideas on virtue in the context of organisation, second to trace 
the development of these ideas and finally to sketch some of the uses to which they 
have been put in the organisational literature. If successful, it will provide one point of 
entry to MacIntyre’s work for readers who have not been introduced to it and make 
some novel suggestions about its development for those who have. 
 
MacIntyre’s critique of contemporary organisations has formed a remarkably 
consistent feature of work that has in wider respects been noted for the changes 
evident in its ideological commitments (Horton and Mendus 1994: 1; Borradori 1994; 
MacIntyre 1994b). In attempting to present elements of his work to make this case, 
our selections reflect authorial intent more than the structure of his original 
arguments. We hope that we have done no violence to the original but are aware that 
this paper is no substitute for it.  
 
The paper begins with some preliminary commentary on epistemology, without which 
our notion of his ‘general theory’ might too easily be seen as a set of abstractions. It 
traces MacIntyre’s occasional work on contemporary organisations between 1953 and 
1980 and suggests that his empirical research with practicing managers in the power 
industry alerted MacIntyre to the parallels between the compartmentalisation of moral 
positions within individuals’ roles as managers, citizens and family member and the 
victory of emotivism over other moral philosophies in the modern age.  The paper 
then provides an account of what we claim to be his ‘general theory’ of virtues, 
goods, practices and institutions which appeared with After Virtue.  It concludes with 
an account of the use of MacIntyre’s ideas in the organisational sciences literatures.  
 
MacIntyre as critical realist 
 
Among the relatively fixed points of MacIntyre’s moving ideological commitments is 
his critical realist approach to method in social science (see Turner 2003). MacIntyre 
sees relations between social structures, social roles (and characters) and the 
framework of ideas in which agency comes to be understood as intimate. The factors 
that agents take to be motives for and justifications of action are historically rooted in 
the type of social roles and ideologies which frame the relations between motives and 
action.   
 
For example, the modern noumenal self needs little justification for action other than 
it be freely chosen, whereas the ancient self of Greek civilisation could not have so 
justified her action because she had not acquired a notion of free choice. For her, 
freedom to choose extended only to alternative means of fulfilling a social role in a 
set of circumstances whose understanding included that of the range of actions 
required by those who inhabit her social role (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 58-59).   
 
It follows that MacIntyre has consistently rejected understandings of social science as 
science (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 88-108), in which human behaviour can be 
explained, predicted and at least in part controlled through the identification of 
relationships between variables, precisely because the understanding of those 
variables is peculiar to social structures in which concepts express relationships 
characteristic of those structures (MacIntyre 1978 [1971]: 83-84). 
 
MacIntyre presents an extended argument in Chapters 6 to 8 of After Virtue in which 
these notions are applied to the claim to expertise relied on by managers for their 
authority (pace Weber).  This is the claim “to possess systematic effectiveness in 
controlling certain aspects of social reality” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 74).   MacIntyre 
argues that such expertise (and the education that promises its transference) requires 
the demonstration of law-like generalizations, hypotheses of causation which predict 
and explain in the same way as those in natural science (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 88-
105).  However, sources of unpredictability in human action (including the notions 
through which behaviour is understood) are such to render knowledge of this kind 
impossible. 
 
MacIntyre concludes that the idea of management’s expertise in controlling social 
outcomes is a myth whose purpose is the maintenance of an ideology in which the 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative action is obscured in the 
name of effectiveness (see also Brehony 2002).  The limits MacIntyre places around 
the claims of social science are no proxy, however, for a commitment to social 
constructivism (and its post-modern allies) in its denial of the possibility of truth (see 
for example, Borradori 1994: 265).   
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MacIntyre’s position is liable to cause readers some confusion and one commentator 
has observed that “it may be MacIntyre’s special distinction to strike half of his 
readers as an old-fashioned universalizing metaphysician (since he defends a version 
of tradition and teleology) while striking the other half as a dangerous relativist” 
(Higgins 2004: 35).   
 
Achtemeier (1994) offers a solution to this problem in arguing that MacIntyre’s 
approach to social science may be labelled ‘critical realist’ (Bhaskar 1975; Hartwig 
2005).  At the risk of over-simplification critical realism can be characterised as an 
approach which maintains the existence of an objective reality (hence exhibits a 
realist ontology) while being sceptical toward our ability to understand it (hence a 
critical epistemology).  MacIntyre’s scepticism carries a unique historical flavour but 
there is enough here that echoes critical realism for MacIntyre’s work to suffer from 
the same misunderstandings that have beset critical realist work.  Part of this problem 
is that readers schooled in modern treatments of research methods have learned 
neither to distinguish between ontology and epistemology nor to recognise that 
abjuring this distinction is itself characteristic of a distinctive position.  
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) collapsing of 
ontology and epistemology into a single subjective-objective axis which along with 
the axis of stability and change serves to locate alternative research paradigms.  For 
MacIntyre such approaches fail in their definition of axes and consequently in their 
attempt to fix boundaries around ideological commitment. What is missing from such 
accounts includes any notion of time.  For MacIntyre intelligibility requires narrative 
and narrative requires historical awareness (1990, 1985 [1981]: 206, 210).   
Summarising MacIntyre’s entire project Murphy writes: 
 
“The path out of the moral wilderness is the formulation of an ethics of human 
nature where human nature is not merely a biological nature but also an 
historical and social nature – and the formulation of an historical, but not 
relativistic, account of rationality in inquiry.” (2003: 7) 
 
MacIntyre’s commitment to historical understanding of the development of ideas is 
bound up with his critical realism – such is the intimacy of the relations between ideas 
and social structures that changes to both over time render redundant any attempt at a 
once-and-for-all determination of paradigms. Accustomed as we are to thinking about 
objectivist and subjectivist assumptions as either opposites or polarities along a 
dimension, an understanding of MacIntyre’s position requires us to recognise that this 
way of thinking about ideas within social science is itself historically specific 
(Tsoukas and Cummings 1997). Indeed in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry 
(1990) MacIntyre traces and dissects the histories of both objectivist and subjectivist 
approaches to moral enquiry (labelled as Encyclopaedia and Genealogy respectively). 
 
In writing such an account historically and not analytically he was committed to, 
argued for and exemplified a different approach to doing social studies – one he labels 
not as ‘critical realist’ but as ‘tradition’. In this approach enquiry is undertaken 
through using the best methods we have discovered up to now to determine the most 
accurate rendering of the truth that can be given up to now. And part of doing 
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intellectual work this way is the acknowledgment of the historical rootedness of our 
ideas, methods and results. 
 
It turns out that we can only understand this if we have available to us a notion of 
tradition in which today’s ‘best so far’ is only ‘best so far’ because it gives a better 
(according to the ‘best so far’ criteria we have of establishing merit) account of 
whatever it is we are considering than have previous accounts (see Borradori 1994: 
262 for a brief version of this argument and MacIntyre 1988 for an extended version).  
The traditional approach to enquiry holds to a notion of truth which seeks neither the 
timelessness of law-like generalisations nor the dissolution of categories through 
which enquiry is undertaken (the end point of genealogy). Skinner and Foucault are 
likewise rejected. 
 
If social theory involves neither testing hypotheses to adduce relations between 
variables in the cause of developing law-like generalisation allowing for control of 
social phenomena, nor deconstructing postulates in the cause of unmasking power 
relations, then what does it involve?  For MacIntyre, social theory is active self-
reflection in the context of practice; the notion of disengaged theorising is illusory. As 
early as 1953 he wrote that, “Hegel forgot what Kierkegaard remembered when 
Kierkegaard said that the tragedy of the speculative philosopher is that he must turn 
aside from his place as a spectator of time and eternity in order to sneeze” (MacIntyre 
1995 [1953]: 16-17), and this opposition to speculative theory remains his position in 
his mature work (MacIntyre 1994a: 289).   
 
His commitment to an engaged philosophy marks an aspect of MacIntyre’s rejection 
of utilitarian and other supposedly ‘rational’ systems constructed in the 
Enlightenment. An early MacIntyre text (1964) captures this. Here he uses Dickens’ 
contrast of Gradgrind’s functional definition of a horse in Hard Times with the “living 
skill” of horse-riding (MacIntyre 1964: 5-6) to illustrate the point that abstract 
knowledge has “nothing to do with an ability to handle horses” (MacIntyre 1964: 6). 
Over thirty years later, his commentary on Marxism’s detachment from practice 
echoes the same point (MacIntyre 1995 [1953]: xxviii-xxx).      
 
From his earliest writings onwards, before his concept of a ‘practice’ became central 
to his mature project (for example MacIntyre 1995 [1953]: 60), through his 
commitments to and rejections of large portions of Marxism (Borradori 1994: 258-
259), he has maintained that social theory should embody features of practical social 
life and that the proper purpose of theory is to enable practitioners to develop better 
understandings of that life.  Further, the ability to resolve the disputes between or 
inconsistencies within previous theories rather than the ability to explain, predict and 
control behaviours is the hallmark of successful theorising (MacIntyre 1977a: 460).   
 
Having set out the broad direction of MacIntyre’s understanding of theorising and 
distinguishing it from what usually is required for systematic thinking to be labelled 
‘theory’ we now turn to a representation of MacIntyre’s theorising about 
organisations.  Although subsequent reflections demonstrate MacIntyre’s rejection of 
some key theses in his first significant publication in this area (particularly his preface 
to its most recent reissue (1995 [1953]: v-xxxi) Marxism and Christianity contains the 
condemnation of the capitalist mode of organisation that has persisted in his work 
(Murphy 2003: 3). In the section that follows we focus on two main features of this 
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criticism of contemporary organisations – the centrality of utilitarianism to corporate 
decision-making and the effects of work under capitalism. We then turn to After 
Virtue in 1981, as it is only from this point that a positive account of work in 
conditions of human flourishing can be found and the centrality of a conception of the 




MacIntyre on contemporary organisations, 1953 - 1980 
 
Decision-making in the capitalist mode 
 
The focus of MacIntyre’s comments on contemporary organisations prior to After 
Virtue is overwhelmingly critical. MacIntyre does not detain readers long with 
distinctions between types of organisation within capitalism but consistently identifies 
capitalism both with modernity and bureaucracy as a mode of production. The 
distinction between public and private organisations is also subsumed in his work 
(MacIntyre 1964: 11; 1985 [1981]: 25) and there is no evidence to suggest, in so far 
as they take on bureaucratic form, that voluntary organisations are in any way exempt.  
His position explicitly follows Weber: 
 
 “Once the executive is at work the aims of the public or private corporation 
must be taken as given … The business executive does not differ in this view 
of his task from other bureaucrats.  Bureaucracies have been conceived, since 
Weber, as impersonal instruments for the realization of ends which 
characteristically they themselves do not determine.” (MacIntyre 1977b: 218) 
 
Bureaucratic organisations resolve allocation questions through a utilitarian mode of 
decision-making that suffers all the incoherencies of both act and rule utilitarianism 
more widely. These are outlined in MacIntyre’s paper Against Utilitarianism in 1964 
and extended to include a wider range of arguments in the chapter cited above on 
Utilitarianism and Cost Benefit Analysis (1977), a precursor to work contained in 
Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they Mutually Exclusive? (1979).    
 
Utilitarianism dominates organisational decision-making because “it provides us with 
our only public criterion for securing agreement on moral and political questions” 
(MacIntyre 1964: 2) but fails in its inability to discover ends or purposes. The 
manager learns to operate without noticing this failure because the boundaries that 
define corporate responsibility ostensibly leave issues of public good to government 
and the goodness of the product to the consumer (MacIntyre 1977b: 219). With such 
considerations apparently externalised the manager generates options for action, gives 
scales to incommensurable alternatives, establishes the weighting of options and 
determines both range and time-scale of affects to be accounted for, using a series of 
non-utilitarian normative and evaluative commitments (MacIntyre 1977b: 220-224).  
It is only once these decisions have been taken that the formal processes of cost-
benefit analysis, job evaluation and so on provide the veneer of objectivity and allow 
the manager to ‘crunch the numbers’. 
 
In an interesting echo of Milton Friedman (1970) MacIntyre asserts that one of the 
functions of this is to avoid the unmanageable conflict that would ensue from any 
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serious engagement with the claims that would follow should boundaries around the 
responsibilities of the role be removed (MacIntyre 1977b: 236-237).  The difference is 
that for Friedman, unlike MacIntyre, ensuring that such questions do not arise is a 
good thing. 
 
The effects of work 
 
In 1953 MacIntyre wrote approvingly of Marx’s notion of alienation as a description 
of the condition of the worker under capitalism: 
 
“Hence it is the worker’s personality, his chance of a properly human life that 
is destroyed by his loss. In this the economic system is not interested. The 
worker owning only his own labor is, in the present system, nothing else but 
his labor, a mere commodity, no longer a person, but a thing.” (MacIntyre 
1995 [1953]: 51, emphasis added) 
 
Putting aside the question of whether this is an accurate portrayal of this or that or 
indeed of every worker’s predicament under capitalism or indeed within any 
bureaucratic organisation, it is the notion of a “properly human life” and later an 
“essentially human life” (MacIntyre 1995 [1953]: 52) against which to contrast the 
assessment that is of particular interest. At this stage all MacIntyre offers by way of a 
positive notion of human life is repetition of Marx’s nostrum of the “realized 
naturalism of men” (MacIntyre 1995 [1953]: 55). MacIntyre later argued that this 
notion found its origin in the German Romantic ideal (MacIntyre 1965 reprinted in 
1978 [1971]: 66).  
 
By this time he had already noted the limits industrialisation puts in the way of any 
such realisation, for it entails that, “all specifiable tasks for human beings can be 
reduced to routine movements which a machine can perform” (MacIntyre 1962: 67), 
thereby reducing any sense of “realized naturalism” or a “properly human life” to a 
grimly ironic and peculiarly undefined joke. It also engenders the distinction between 
those who manipulate and those who are manipulated that plays a central role in After 
Virtue some 16 years later, and which forms a core part of his contention that 
modernity is characterised by emotivism (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 11-12).   
 
The manipulators were themselves no nearer realising an “essential humanity”. By the 
mid-1960’s MacIntyre had taken Weber’s description of the bureaucratic manager as 
read and accepted the transformation from individualist to what may be labelled 
managerial capitalism (Nielsen 2002) in a way that was not evident a decade earlier 
in Marxism and Christianity: 
 
“The earliest critics of capitalism saw social power as in the hands of ‘Them’, 
when it ought to serve ‘Us’. But power is now, although it is no nearer ‘We’, 
not so much a matter of ‘They’ as ‘It’.” (MacIntyre 1964: 13)    
 
And from this point forward the ‘It’ increasingly attracts MacIntyre’s attention in the 
character of the bureaucratic manager. His descriptions in the 1964 paper prefigure 
much of what was to follow. Using Hegel’s concept of ‘the spiritual Zoo’ he identifies 
managers as sharing the morality of those “who live in separate cages and choose not 
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to ask why there are bars or what lies outside them” (MacIntyre 1964: 14) but instead 
occupy themselves fully with the issues that lie to hand.  
 
In similar vein A Short History of Ethics in 1967 sees the managers of the holocaust 
as epitomizing a utilitarian orientation in which “specialists such as Eichmann … 
boasted that they merely discharged their function in arranging for so much transport 
to be provided between point X and point Y. Whether the cargo was sheep or Jews, 
whether points X and Y were farm and butcher’s slaughterhouse or ghetto and gas 
chamber, was no concern of theirs” (MacIntyre 1967: 207-208).   
 
MacIntyre next addresses workplace issues in something other than passing 
commentary some twelve years later through his involvement with a University of 
Notre Dame Project involving executives in the electrical power industry. This 
resulted in his most detailed work on organisations to date. His role in this project, 
coming at a time of “sometimes painful self-critical reflection” (Reddiford and Watts 
Miller 1991; Miller 1994: 268) appears significant to his wider corpus as the papers 
that resulted presage a number of the arguments subsequently found in After Virtue. 
 
The role of the bureaucratic manager was still geared to the performance of utilitarian 
calculations designed to enhance organisational effectiveness but a more dramatic 
implication had become evident. For while the manager (in any bureaucratic 
organisation) remained in the spiritual zoo, systematically excluding from his purview 
considerations “which he might feel obliged to recognise were he acting as parent, as 
consumer, or as citizen” (MacIntyre 1979: 126), he also carried roles as parent, 
consumer and citizen. Those who fulfilled these roles were now seen as 
compartmentalised selves for whom adaptability in changing their ostensive character 
was an essential quality: “in the modern corporate organization character has become 
more like a mask or a suit of clothing; an agent may have to possess more than one” 
(MacIntyre 1979: 125).  In private correspondence MacIntyre has confirmed to us that 
his thinking was in part developed through empirical work in which hypothetical 
scenarios were put to the power company executives (6 October 2005).  
 
In a world “dominated by corporations” (MacIntyre 1979: 128) their presentation as 
moral beings “splinters morality into disassociated parts” (MacIntyre 1979: 124), a 
partitioning unique to corporate modernity. The importance of MacIntyre’s work with 
practicing managers is that the publication which followed introduces for the first 
time in his writing the contrast between the partitioned morality of corporate 
modernity and the integrated morality of practice-based communities in “a total order 
which both integrates diverse roles and subordinate orders” (MacIntyre 1979: 132).  
The observed weaknesses of managers’ utilitarian thinking and the fragmented 
existence of managers under corporate capitalism both illustrates the intimacy 
between social structures and social ideology and justifies the project of creating an 
alternative, a project he was to begin with After Virtue: 
 
“What positively would have to be the case to provide the conditions for a 
society in which man as such and of rational criteria could have a place?  To 




MacIntyre on contemporary organisations, 1981 - 1999: a ‘general theory’ of 
virtues, goods, practices and institutions 
 
After Virtue combines an account of the failure of the Enlightenment project of 
developing a universal rational morality with a case for recovering the virtue-based 
account of morality that it wrongly attempted to supersede. Reflecting MacIntyre’s 
continuing view of the intimacy of theoretical and practical social developments is an 
account of social development and particularly that of the fragmented morality of the 
corporate organisation that both reflects and fosters the state of moral theory. Part of 
what the Enlightenment forgot and bureaucracies private or public have never fully 
accounted for is a distinction between the two categories of good whose creation 
results from socially co-operative practices. As early as 1964 MacIntyre hinted at this 
issue: 
 
“The production of consumption is as much a mark of our society as the 
consumption of what is produced. Hence each becomes a means to the other 
and we find once more a chain of activity in which everything is done for the 
sake of something else and nothing is done for its own sake.” (MacIntyre 
1964: 8-9, emphasis added) 
 
The obliteration of ends, as we have seen, is a central weakness of the utilitarian mode 
of decision-making, the corporate form that masks it and the men and women whose 
lives it characterises. 
 
In After Virtue MacIntyre introduced a new language to describe both the distinction 
between goods that are proper ends – internal goods, and those “done for the sake of 
something else” – external goods, and the relationship of these to virtues, practices 
and institutions. Parts of this ‘general theory’ have been used by various 
commentators, with the emphasis usually on the notions of virtues and practices. But 
it is clear that MacIntyre intended his contribution to be an integrated schema (one 
exception to this partial usage is that by Moore 2002, 2005a, 2005b.). 
 
There is then a tension between these two different types of goods (MacIntyre 1985 
[1981]: 188-189). Internal goods, such as those obtainable from loving relationships, 
playing or listening to a piece of music, or from various kinds of intellectual 
stimulation are generally derivable from the exercise of the virtues in a search for 
excellence within the context of a particular practice. By contrast external goods such 
as prestige, status or money can be achieved in a variety of alternative ways not linked 
to any particular practice. These are referred to as “goods of effectiveness”, as 
opposed to internal goods which are “goods of excellence”. That these different types 
of goods (they are both genuinely “goods”) are mutually reinforcing should be 
evident. As MacIntyre puts it: 
 
“It would be a large misconception to suppose that allegiance to goods of the 
one kind necessarily excluded allegiance to goods of the other … Thus the 
goods of excellence cannot be systematically cultivated unless at least some of 
the goods of effectiveness are also pursued. On the other hand it is difficult in 
most social contexts to pursue the goods of effectiveness without cultivating at 
least to some degree the goods of excellence …” (MacIntyre 1988: 35) 
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However, while in the ideal situation these different kinds of goods are mutually 
reinforcing, it is clear from MacIntyre’s work that internal goods should be privileged 
over external goods if the good life is to be achieved. The danger is that the opposite 
occurs. MacIntyre warns: “[w]e should therefore expect that, if in a particular society 
the pursuit of external goods were to become dominant, the concept of the virtues 
[necessary for the achievement of internal goods] might suffer first attrition and then 
perhaps something near total effacement, although simulacra might abound” 
(MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 196). 
 
There is the beginning here of the link between virtues and goods, but in order to 
understand this more fully we require MacIntyre’s concept of a practice. His oft-
quoted definition is as follows: 
 
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in 
the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends 
and goods involved, are systematically extended.” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 
187) 
 
The concept of a practice allows MacIntyre to move from an initial definition of 
virtues (“dispositions not only to act in particular ways but also to feel in particular 
ways. To act virtuously … is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the 
virtues” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 149)), to link virtues with internal goods and 
practices more specifically: 
 
“A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and 
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” 
(MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 191) 
 
MacIntyre illustrates this relationship between virtues and practices by reference to 
examples including football, chess, architecture, seascape painting and cricket 
(MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 187, 191) and argues that, “it is not difficult to show for a 
whole range of key virtues that without them the goods internal to practices are barred 
to us …” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]:: 191). It is also clear that there is considerable 
breadth in his concept of a practice (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 188), and this can be 
regarded both as a strength and, as we shall discuss below, a weakness of his ‘general 
theory’. 
 
Virtues, however, are not simply practice-specific, but span and are applicable to all 
practices and situations in which an individual is involved. Not only this, but the 
virtues are also set within the context of the notion of telos – the good for man (sic): 
“[t]he virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an 
individual to achieve eudaimonia [generally defined as well-being] and the lack of 
which will frustrate his movement toward that telos” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 148). 
Thus we have a situation in which the virtues enable the individual to achieve the 
goods internal to practices, and the achievement of those goods across a variety of 
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practices and over time is instrumental in the individual’s search for and movement 
towards their own telos. 
 
We thus arrive at a point in MacIntyre’s ‘general theory’ at which the concept of a 
quest becomes important. For the virtues are clearly not ends in themselves but means 
to the end of achieving the individual’s telos. MacIntyre makes the point that without 
some partly determinate conception of the final telos there could not be any beginning 
to a quest. This initial conception of the telos comes from the amalgamation of the 
internal goods from individual practices to some notion of the good. But in addition to 
this, there is within the concept of the quest the idea that it is a search for something 
which is not yet “adequately characterised” and that it is through the search that the 
goal of the quest is finally to be understood. So the telos is both partially known and 
unknown, and in the quest for the unknown, we also refine our understanding of the 
known (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 218-219). 
 
This brings us to the concept of the unity of a person’s life, in which a life can be 
conceived of and evaluated only as a whole. But to evaluate a person’s life as a whole 
requires the context of the relationships they are involved in and the possible shared 
future of those relationships – and this in turn requires that we understand the “story” 
of that person’s life. 
 
Men and women are narrative animals – that is, life is lived inside a story of which the 
individual is the subject, but also in which there are interlocking narratives with others 
(MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 217-218). This is to say that an individual’s story began 
before she was born (and will continue after she dies) and that she entered life as part 
of a continuing narrative. It is only within the context of this continuing and 
communal narrative that she can make sense of herself and that she can begin to make 
some sense of her telos. Initially this telos is derived from the experiences of early 
childhood, but gradually it becomes hers as she embarks on her own narrative quest. 
Thus, the narrative quest (“where is my story going?”) is both teleological and also 
part of its own answer. In other words, as we have noted, it is not a quest for the 
already known, but a quest in which the telos will become clearer on the way.  
 
This concept of the narrative quest leads MacIntyre to a further refinement of his 
definition of the virtues: 
 
“The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which 
will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods 
internal to practices, but which will sustain us in the relevant kind of 
quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will 
furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of 
the good.” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 219) 
 
It is important to emphasise that this sense of telos and the narrative quest is by no 
means an individual matter. McCann and Brownsberger summarise MacIntyre well at 
this point and helpfully link the concepts of practice and community. It is worth 
quoting them at length: 
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“… the normative character of MacIntyre’s definition of a social practice … is 
secured within a larger account of the moral life as a whole. There must be 
some telos to human life, a vision anticipating the moral unity of life, given in 
the form of a narrative history that has meaning within a particular 
community’s traditions; otherwise the various internal goods generated by the 
range of social practices will remain disordered and potentially subversive of 
one another. Without a community’s shared sense of telos, there will be no 
way of signifying ‘the overriding good’ by which various internal goods may 
be ranked and evaluated.” (McCann and Brownsberger 1990: 227-228) 
 
This, then, affirms the essential intertwining of the individual, and his or her own 
narrative quest, with the community, and its shared sense of telos. It is in community 
that the virtues are developed and (partially) for whose good they are exercised. 
 
However, this initial virtues-practice schema, in which internal goods attainable at the 
individual level are to the fore but in the context of community, needs to be extended 
by the addition of the institution that houses the practice – at which point both 
external goods and organisations (as a particular form of institution) enter the frame. 
MacIntyre writes: 
 
“Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external 
goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they 
are structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power 
and status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not 
only themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. For no 
practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed 
so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of 
the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that 
institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which 
the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common 
goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution. In this context the essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without 
them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the 
corrupting power of institutions.” (MacIntyre 1985 [1981]: 194) 
 
Thus, institutions form an essential part of MacIntyre’s ‘general theory’. Without 
them his schema is incomplete. With them we begin to understand why MacIntyre 
takes such a critical stance towards capitalist organisations – organisations which in 
his view have, in effect, ‘won’ over the practice that is actually at their core and 
whose justification is the pursuit of the goods of effectiveness. MacIntyre’s critique, 
as we have seen above but expressed now in the terms of his ‘general theory’, is that 
“much modern industrial productive and service work is organised so as to exclude 
the features distinctive of a practice” and in such a way that this type of activity is “at 
once alien and antagonistic to practices” (MacIntyre 1994a: 286). Thus, capitalist and 
other bureaucratic organisations fail to provide the kind of conducive environment 
within which the virtues may flourish and internal goods (the goods of excellence) 
may be achieved. 
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It might be thought that, within the context of his ‘general theory’, MacIntyre would 
hold out some sympathy towards managers, locked as they are inside such capitalist 
organisations. In his 1999 lecture Social structure and their threats to moral agency, 
MacIntyre addresses this by returning both to Eichmann and to the life of managers as 
compartmentalised selves. He discusses the extent to which social structure 
undermines the development of the type of understanding required by agents to see 
themselves as having a moral identity distinguishable from their social role(s). 
However, his position on the moral responsibility of managers has been amended. 
 
Whereas the 1964 MacIntyre asserts that, “[t]he faceless men of the contemporary 
corporation are themselves instruments not by virtue of some act of will of their own   
… but by virtue of the structure of the corporation” (MacIntyre 1964: 13, emphasis 
added), such determinism is heavily conditioned in the 1999 account. Here, although 
“there is indeed a type of social structure that warrants for those who inhabit it a plea 
of diminished responsibility” (MacIntyre 1999a: 325), the plea is not accepted for 
managers in contemporary organisations. 
 
Drawing again from the studies of power company executives, MacIntyre’s notion of 
compartmentalisation sees managers as playing a more active part. The ability to 
change roles and role requirements as the agent moves between social settings is 
named as a peculiarly modern virtue, a “dramatic feat” (MacIntyre 1999a: 326). 
Moreover MacIntyre now asserts that its achievement necessarily involves a 
deliberate termination of the agent’s practical reasoning in order to resist inescapable 
questions that might undermine the conduct of the managerial role. For MacIntyre this 
habitual discipline of intellectual abstinence requires the active co-operation of the 
individual manager who is thus regarded as a co-author of his or her own divided state 
(MacIntyre 1999a: 327).    
 
 
MacIntyre in the Organisational Sciences 
 
From the publication of After Virtue onwards MacIntyre’s influence and reputation 
have grown.  This is  replicated in the literatures of a number of professions (for 
example, Lambeth 1990; Sellman 2000; Leeper and Leeper 2001), in business ethics 
(for example, Beadle 2002; Brewer 1997; Dawson and Bartholomew 2003; Dobson 
1996, 1997, 2001; Horvarth 1995; McCann and Brownsberger 1990; Mintz 1996; 
Moore 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Wicks 1996, 1997) and organisational thought (for 
example, Alvesson and Willmott 1992; Anthony 1986; Du Gay 1998, 2000; 
Mangham 1995).    
 
The distinction we draw here between these literatures belies some of their similarities 
but trends can nevertheless be discerned. The professional literatures commonly 
attempt to establish the relevant profession as a practice, hence Lambeth’s (1990) 
argument in respect of journalism, Sellman’s (2000) for nursing, Brewer’s for 
management (1997), Leeper and Leeper’s (2001) for public relations and most 
recently Dunne and Hogan (2004) on teaching, a volume of papers animated by the 
rejection of MacIntyre’s view (MacIntyre and Dunne 2002) that teaching is not a 
practice itself, and in which some contributors go almost so far as to assert that 
MacIntyre does not understand his own concept.   
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Whilst each of these papers merits individual consideration a degree of commonality 
is evident. Many engage in the same arguments as one another whilst appearing 
ignorant of each other’s existence and of MacIntyre’s work beyond the pages of After 
Virtue. All identify relevant internal goods with the ambition of establishing these as a 
warrant for awarding their profession the status of a practice. The problem with this 
however (and not the only problem for some, see Beadle 2002) is that the 
establishment of internal goods is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
identification of a practice – the neglected conditions being around the role of the 
practice in the narrative of an individual’s life, the tradition of the community to 
which individuals belong and the inter-connected role of institutions. These are 
exactly the conditions that MacIntyre identifies as being absent in teaching where he 
asserts: 
 
 “it is part of my claim that teaching is never more than a means, that it has  
 no point and purpose except for the point and purpose of the activities to 
which it introduces students. All teaching is for the sake of something else and 
so teaching does not have its own goods. The life of a teacher is therefore not 
a specific kind of life.” (MacIntyre and Dunne 2002: 9) 
 
The project of elevating professions to the status of practices turns on the specificity 
of the kind of life in which practitioners engage and this is just one more reason why 
small working communities are the ideal environment for the development of the 
practices and why industrial society, by drawing work outside the context of such 
communities and households, is so destructive of them (MacIntyre: 1985 [1981]: 
229).   
 
The ongoing contestability of MacIntyre’s concept of a practice is problematic 
however. In part this is MacIntyre’s own fault.  The paucity of his organisational 
examples and the ambiguity of his definition (Miller 1994) perhaps encourages the 
rationally interminable debate, of which he has written in other contexts, to be a 
feature of arguments about his own work. 
 
The business ethics literature runs up against a somewhat different range of 
conceptual and practical difficulties (Knight 1994: 283). In his paper Does applied 
ethics rest on a mistake? (1984) MacIntyre’s affirmative answer appears to rule out 
any normative business ethics for sharing with other areas of applied ethics a falsely 
elevated notion of the philosophical importance of immediate factual context. This 
has not put business ethicists off, however. Horvarth (1995) goes so far as to argue 
that a MacIntyre-style Virtue Ethics should become the paradigm for business ethics, 
applying MacIntyre’s critiques of Enlightenment thinking to suggest that utilitarian 
and deontological approaches provide inadequate bases for business ethics, whilst 
largely sidestepping MacIntyre’s own condemnation of corporate modernity. 
Similarly, McCann and Brownsberger (1990) argue that business can be a context for 
the development of the virtues. A contest between Dobson and Wicks in their 1996 
and 1997 papers broadly turned on the justification for MacIntyre’s condemnation of 
capitalism, an issue revisited by Beadle (2002) and Moore (2002) and summarised by 
Dobson and Bartholomew (2003).   
 
The literature we broadly identify as falling within organisational theory has been 
more critical of MacIntyre and in particular of his condemnation of management.  
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Anthony (1996) argues that MacIntyre mistakes the activity of management with 
Weber’s characterisation of it (174-180), while Du Gay’s (1998, 2000) criticism is 
effectively a justification of context-specific rationalities such as that established by 
Weber for management (though Tester (2000) argues from the opposite perspective 
that MacIntyre does not so much oppose as misreads Weber). The critical 
management literature tends to cite MacIntyre loosely as a fellow traveller (Alvesson 
and Willmott 1992) in the condemnation of management and capitalism while 
ignoring his opposition to their post-modern epistemology, though Mangham (1995) 




This paper has attempted to show that MacIntyre’s judgments on the bureaucratic 
organisations that characterise the institutional form of modernity have remained 
consistent from the 1950s. What has developed is a theory for authoritatively 
justifying these judgements – a theory both about capitalism and about why it is 
wrong. MacIntyre established the centrality of the task of authoritatively justifying 
Marxism’s condemnation of capitalism as early as 1953 (MacIntyre 1995 [1953]) and 
its notion of human life unencumbered by capitalism in 1965 (reprinted in MacIntyre 
1978 [1971]: 66). 
 
Its resolution has required the development of both a substantive notion of human 
nature to which the virtues are central (MacIntyre 1985 [1981], 1999b) and a theory 
demonstrating their systematic dependence on a form of institutionalisation alien to 
the dominant forms of corporate modernity whether public or private sector. Indeed 
Murphy sees the vindication of MacIntyre’s condemnation of capitalism as the central 
task of MacIntyre’s work (Murphy 2003: 7). In developing this latter argument 
MacIntyre has critiqued both the effects of corporate modernity and its conceptual 
confusions (MacIntyre 1977b, 1979 and 1985 [1981]).  The relationship between 
these is intimate but the responsibility of individual managers for their own vice is 
clearer in more recent work (MacIntyre 1999a) than in earlier representations. 
 
Developing MacIntyre’s ideas in the context of organisations has, however, run up 
against a series of obstacles and the application of MacIntyre’s work evidences the 
type of rational interminability (and indeed repetitiveness) that MacIntyre regards as 
emblematic of modern moral dialogue as a whole. The problem of applying 
MacIntyre’s concepts, as he himself has admitted, is that a great deal more needs to be 
said about the concept of a practice and the idea of internal goods than has been said 
so far (Reddiford and Watts Miller 1991: 273-274). The dispute over the status of 
teaching is emblematic of the uses to which the definitions he has given can be put. 
Equally those who contest his condemnation of capitalism and those who support it 
appear locked in interminable struggle. 
 
What is also evident is the lack of empirical work undertaken using MacIntyre’s 
concepts. This sits oddly with his emphasis on practice and with the clear task of 
filling in the gaps in the dynamic aspects of his theory. MacIntyre has, as we noted 
above, maintained that social theory should embody features of practical social life 
and that the proper purpose of theory is to develop better understandings of that life.  
Much more needs to be done to establish how the virtues work (literally) in practice to 
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enable the creation of internal goods and how such development is corrupted by the 
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